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ABSTRACT Manufacturing is facing a host of new security challenges due to the convergence of
information technology (IT) and operational technology (OT) in the industry. This paper addresses the
challenges that arise due to the use of low power Industrial Internet of Things (IIoT) devices in modular
manufacturing systems of Industry 4.0. First, we analyze security challenges concerning the manufacturing
execution system (MES) and programmable logic controllers (PLC) in IIoT through a selective literature
review. Second, we present an exploratory case study to determine a protocol for cryptographic key man-
agement and key exchange suitable for the Smart Production Lab of Aalborg University (a learning cyber-
physical factory). Finally, we combine the findings of the case study with a quality function deployment
(QFD) method to determine design requirements for Industry 4.0. We identify specific requirements from
both the high-level domain of factory capabilities and the low-level domain of cryptography and translate
requirements between these domains using a QFD analysis. The recommendations for designing a secure
smart factory focus on how security can be implemented for low power and low-cost IIoT devices. Even
though there have been a few studies on securing IT to OT data exchange, we conclude that the field is not
yet in a state where it can be applied in practice with confidence.
INDEX TERMS Internet of Things, Information security, Manufacturing systems, Information systems,
Manufacturing operations management, Manufacturing flexibility, Cyber-physical systems, Industrial cy-
bersecurity, Smart factory
I. INTRODUCTION
The Industrial Internet of Things (IIoT) has the potential
to disrupt the traditional manufacturing industry. However,
this industry seems unprepared to handle the challenges sur-
rounding its cybersecurity infrastructure, especially in wire-
less networks. This paper provides guidelines for managing
security in a smart factory, which is a central concept of
Industry 4.0.
Boyes et al. 2018 [1] propose the following definition of
IIoT:
“A system comprising networked smart objects,
cyber-physical assets, associated generic informa-
tion technologies and optional cloud or edge com-
puting platforms, which enable real-time, intelli-
gent, and autonomous access, collection, analysis,
communications, and exchange of process, product
and/or service information, within the industrial
environment, so as to optimise overall production
value. This value may include; improving product
or service delivery, boosting productivity, reducing
labour costs, reducing energy consumption, and
reducing the build to-order cycle.”
The Industry 4.0 vision of the smart factory concerns digitiz-
ing manufacturing operations using futuristic technologies,
with a design principle of interconnection, which pertains
to devices being connected over a network. Interconnection
deals with the IIoT [2], Internet of People [3], and the Internet
of Everything [4], while creating challenges and opportuni-
ties concerning the IIoT devices. The ISA 95 hierarchy of
systems [5] is becoming distributed due to the adoption of
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the IIoT. This introduces new security challenges, which are
to be addressed by creating solutions for secure networks in
smart factories.
Many manufacturing facilities around the world have al-
ready been subject to attacks due to failures of industrial
cyber-security. A well-known case of a cyber-attack based
on industrial control systems is that of Stuxnet in Iran in
2010, where over 15 Uranium enrichment facilities were
infiltrated [6]. This attack was aimed at impairing the nu-
clear program of Iran; more than 900 uranium enrichment
centrifuges were estimated to be damaged, as the attack could
inflict physical damage to the equipment. There is an increas-
ing trend of such attacks in industries around the world. Some
of the recent ones are WannaCry (2017), the TRITON attack
on Saudi Arabia Petrochemical (2017), and the LockerGaga
attack on the Norwegian Aluminum Company (2019), as well
as a recent attempt on a Tesla factory in Nevada (2020).
Security in the IIoT entails the protection of industrial
automation and control systems against unauthorized access,
information theft, and interference with the proper func-
tioning of the factory [7]. This is achieved for example
by securing the links between devices via cryptographic
encryption and authentication methods, by deploying strong
firewalls, and by monitoring all access and detecting anoma-
lies [8]. The manufacturing environment provides additional
challenges compared to traditional information technology
(IT) systems, especially due to the convergence of IT and
operational technology (OT) systems. Some of these chal-
lenges are the use of heterogeneous components, low power
devices with long lifespans, real-time requirements, and the
risk of physical damage to humans, equipment or the envi-
ronment [9]. Low power devices are devices with low en-
ergy consumption, though our paper predominantly focuses
on devices with low processing power and memory, which
often are consequences of low energy consumption. Paes et
al. 2020 [10] define IT/OT convergence as follows:
“IT/OT convergence is the integration of IT sys-
tems applied to data-centric computing with OT
systems used to monitor events, processes, and
devices and make adjustments in enterprise and
industrial operations. IT is composed of those hard-
ware and software system technologies that allow
for corresponding information processing. OT is
supported by physical devices, i.e., switches, sen-
sors, power distribution networks, valves, motors,
and software that allow for control and monitoring
of a plant and its associated equipment.”
Our impression from the literature is that security man-
agement in IIoT is still a nascent topic, since the majority of
studies only focus on the benefits of connecting machines,
devices, processes, sensors, and people over the network in
a factory. However, some studies do warn about the security
challenges and emphasize the need for a multi-layered secu-
rity strategy around the enterprise information systems [1].
There has been a series of papers attempting to design
FIGURE 1. Research focus.
cryptographic protocols that are specifically suited to the low
power, low latency characteristics of the IIoT, e.g. [11], [12],
but there remains the question of how to apply these ideas
to existing enterprise information systems. Motivated by this
need, we study the inherent security challenges in the con-
text of IIoT and analyze existing cryptographic solutions to
derive design considerations for the IT/OT link. Our research
objective is to identify the capabilities in a factory to connect
to any IIoT device securely and easily.
The intersection of the Venn diagram in Fig. 1 shows our
focus area. The IT system in the case of IT/OT convergence
is usually a manufacturing operations management system
of ISA 95, which in most cases is a manufacturing execution
system (MES) or the like. In this paper, we use MES as repre-
sentative of IT, and programmable logic controllers (PLC) as
representative of OT, even though these concepts can include
systems other than MES and PLCs. For example, OT could
also include single-board computers such as Raspberry Pis,
smart sensors, and computer numerical control systems. IT
could include various edge and cloud servers or an IIoT
platform separated from the MES.
A. CONTRIBUTIONS
Our work makes both theoretical and practical contributions.
The following is a summary of our main contributions.
• We explore the security concerns relating to the IT/OT
link for low power IIoT devices and examine the rel-
evant smart factory design principle of interconnection
in the context of ISA 95. We find that the IT/OT link
and the cryptographic solutions for it are a weak point
in IIoT.
• We analyze cryptographic protocols for IIoT devices
with a focus on key management and authenticated key
exchange. We study the feasibility of certificateless key
exchange protocols in the context of the Smart Pro-
duction Lab (Smart Lab) of Aalborg University, which
serves as a case example of a modular manufacturing
system.
• We propose design recommendations for securing the
IT/OT link, using a quality function deployment (QFD)
tool to translate between high and low-level require-
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ments. We use the case of the Smart Lab to derive
a high-level architecture for secure data exchange be-
tween the MES and the PLCs. We also outline some
avenues for future research.
B. OUTLINE OF THE PAPER
Section II presents the background for the design challenge
as well as related work. In Section III, we provide the
methodology of our work. Section IV presents an overview
of existing cryptographic security measures and Section V
describes the research approach where the Smart Lab case
is used. The findings from the case study and QFD are
discussed in Section VI. Finally, some conclusions are drawn
in Section VII.
II. BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK
This paper is concerned with attacks that are carried out by
interfering with the network connection between IT and OT.
This particularly affects the IIoT, since it can involve many
connections, including connections over the Internet. There
are other possible attack vectors, which we do not focus on,
such as in the case of Stuxnet, where a worm was installed
using an infected USB drive.
A. DESIGN PRINCIPLE OF INTERCONNECTION FOR
SMART FACTORIES
Industry 4.0 business requirements aim to address the cus-
tomer responsiveness challenges by increasing product va-
riety and decreasing the product life cycles [13], and these
needs are supported by modular manufacturing systems.
Easy, secure, and standards-based connections between ma-
chines, devices, sensors, and personal devices will enable the
flexibility of combining equipment from different vendors,
thus enabling modular manufacturing systems [14]. The tech-
nical requirements of Industry 4.0 can be derived from the
following design principles for smart factories [15]: (a) In-
terconnection (b) Information transparency (c) Decentralized
decision-making (d) Technical assistance. Here, the principle
of interconnection is relevant to our study because it deals
with connecting machines, devices, sensors, and people over
the IIoT [2].
Industry 4.0 needs digitalization enabled by enterprise in-
formation systems such as MES [16] for real-time operations
and robust information management [17]. ISA 95 presents
object models which can be used as a basis for developing
MES functionalities [18].
ISA 95 is an information-oriented standard, which con-
tains models and terminology that are useful to analyze the
information systems of a manufacturing company. It has a
functional hierarchy model which separates the enterprise
domain from the control domain in a manufacturing enter-
prise, and aims to achieve a seamless data flow between them.
Scholten [18] describes the goals of the ISA 95 standards as
follows:
“The standard can be used to simplify the imple-
mentation of new software products and to ulti-
mately have enterprise and control systems that
interoperate and easily integrate.”
MES takes its position in Level 3 in ISA 95 and offers a
critical link between the shop floor and business (see Fig. 2).
However, ISA 95 does not cover the digital interconnection
to enable IIoT, therefore the traditional automation hierarchy
needs to be reformed while considering security manage-
ment.
For Industry 4.0, many manufacturers consider MES as a
suitable candidate for IIoT data aggregation and processing.
If an MES is designed with the functionalities of ISA 95, it
can be deployed in the following three combinations:
1) An MES server completely hosted on the cloud;
2) An MES completely hosted on a local server (on-
premise);
3) Some MES functionalities hosted on the cloud, some
locally (hybrid).
In most cases, the MES is not run on the cloud, but it is
connected to cloud services for analytics. Enterprise resource
planning (ERP) may be hosted in the cloud as well. Even
though it is attractive to have the MES as an app on the cloud
for data analytics (see Fig. 2), our design recommendations
primarily cater to manufacturers who are looking to host the
MES on a local server.
Having (parts of) the MES hosted locally can simplify
security considerations, because PLCs do not need to be
directly connected to the Internet. Hence, well-established
protocols like Transport Layer Security (TLS) can be em-
ployed to secure connections over the Internet, and only local
connections need to take into account the limited processing
power of PLCs.
B. SMART FACTORY NEEDS FOR EDGE COMPUTING
Edge computing is an attractive option for smart facto-
ries [20], [21] because it could solve the challenges of data
overload and latency. Edge computing belongs to the dis-
tributed computing paradigm and involves the offloading of
computation, storage of production data, and communication
to physical devices on or near the shop floor. Edge computing
stands in contrast to cloud computing, where production data
are stored and analyzed on centralized servers, often distant
from the place where it originates and where the results of the
analysis are needed. By being close to the production assets
of the shop floor, edge computing avoids the high latency
inherent in cloud computing and is therefore better suited to
fulfill real-time requirements. Furthermore, edge computing
is much more reliable than cloud computing where there is
a risk of Internet outages. Edge and cloud computing are
often used together in factories, with less critical tasks being
offloaded to the cloud.
When several edge servers are present in a factory, and
PLCs send their performance data directly to them, the num-
ber of IT to OT connections that need to be secured is greatly
increased. Hence, it becomes even more important to be able
to automatically and efficiently establish secure connections
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FIGURE 2. Architecture showing interconnection and digitalization of traditional ISA 95 hierarchy of systems in IIoT [19].
between newly added PLCs and MES/edge servers, which
falls within the scope of our problem.
C. RELATED WORK ON SECURITY ISSUES IN IIOT
We conduct a selective literature review using Google
Scholar to understand the state of the art of security issues in
IT/OT interconnection in IIoT. We look specifically for recent
studies concerning security issues of IIoT in the ISA 95
hierarchy. The results of our literature review are summarized
in Table 1.
There is a large body of literature addressing security
challenges and possible attacks in the Internet of Things (IoT)
in general, e.g. [27]–[30]. However, we focus here on the
literature that specifically concerns IIoT.
Several recent studies have addressed and categorized the
security challenges and requirements for IIoT, from dif-
ferent approaches. For example, [22] categorizes security
challenges based on whether they apply to IoT in general,
or are specific to IIoT. In [9], the ways in which security
considerations differ between IIoT and traditional IT systems
are discussed. A systematic literature review of IIoT security
requirements is presented in [24]. [26] describes security
challenges affecting IIoT along with recent cybersecurity
incidents in Industry 4.0.
Specific attacks that could be leveraged against IIoT are
surveyed in e.g. [25], which gives a taxonomy of attacks at
the different layers in the IIoT architecture based on the at-
tack vector, target, impact, and consequence. In [31], attacks
against IoT and IIoT, and countermeasures against them,
are categorized based on whether they target the physical
hardware, the network, the data, or the software. Also, [9]
lists different types of attack as well as potential sources of
attacks (such as nation-states, or rival organizations).
There are also a number of studies and surveys that give
overviews of security solutions and standards relating to IIoT.
For example, [9] presents a high-level overview of some of
the most important security solutions, such as regulations and
standards, cryptographic techniques, and intrusion detection.
[32] discusses cryptographic algorithms and key manage-
ment, and the issues regarding their implementation under
the constraints of IIoT. A detailed review of cryptographic
key establishment protocols is provided in [33]. A survey of
existing standards for security and interoperability in Indus-
try 4.0 is presented in [23]. In [34], the security properties of
different IIoT edge and platform connectivity protocols are
analyzed.
We note that there are several studies that explore security
challenges, attacks, and security solutions for IIoT. However,
there is still only a limited understanding of how and how
well these solutions can be applied to IIoT devices in prac-
tice. This, we believe, is because most of the research we
found does not consult a concrete example of a smart factory.
D. SUMMARY
The literature shows the need to develop security man-
agement methods in operational architecture. An MES has
features from an enterprise-level IT system as well as an
industrial control system featuring high-level process control.
Since MES is the interface between the IT and OT domain,
the role of secure interconnection in these layers needs a
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TABLE 1. Studies on IIoT security concerning Level 3 of ISA 95 (or Purdue model).
Author(s) Goal of paper Key takeaway Method Challenges identified
Boyes, 2018 [1] Analysis framework and
taxonomy for IIoT
Purdue model is used to give
background, definitions, and
taxonomy to classify IIoT devices;
and to explain IIoT including
security
Review Security considerations for
installing IIoT devices in an
operational architecture
Yu, 2019 [22] To survey security challenges
around IIoT
IIoT has specific security
concerns mainly for critical
industrial control systems
Literature survey Industry-specific challenge due to
IT and OT convergence,
cyberattacks on OT
Watson,
2017 [23]
To give an overview of existing
Interoperability and security
standards, such as IEC 62443, the
ISO 27000 series, IEC 62541,
OPC Unified Architecture and
TSN (IEEE 1722-2016)
Industry 4.0 architecture features
interconnection where security
challenges need to be sufficiently
addressed
No method
identified
Additional testing and extensions
are required for security and
interoperability standards due to
IIoT
Tange, 2020 [24] To survey the security
requirements of IIoT
Fog computing as a security
solution for the IIoT
Systematic
literature review
Safety requirements compete with
security in terms of resources
Panchal,
2018 [25]
To discuss the potential security
threats to the Industries adapting
to IIoT
Listed various possible attacks on
the components in the layered
IIoT architecture, along with a
taxonomy
No method
identified
No challenges identified
Bajramovic,
2019 [26]
To describe some of the security
challenges and best practices in
IIoT
Merging IT and OT exposes
technologies with identified
vulnerabilities
Also studied the Reference
Architecture Model of
Industry 4.0
No method
identified
Establish a need for security
standards
Morariu,
2018 [7]
To study security challenges in
distributed MES architectures and
provide a policy-based security
mechanism for transport and
document security
Usage of public key infrastructure
on the shop floor
Experiment Mentioned the security need for
preventing unauthorized access to
information, theft of proprietary
information and impersonation
better understanding, both theoretical and practical. Hence,
we pose the following questions for this paper:
Q1) Is it possible for the MES to connect securely and
wirelessly to PLCs in IIoT, given the need to readily add new
OT devices to the network?
Q2) What special considerations are necessary for security
between the MES and PLCs in the IIoT?
To address these questions, there is a need to look into
cryptographic developments in IIoT. We elaborate on this in
Section IV.
III. METHODOLOGY
Based on a selective literature review on security in IIoT
(see II-C), we have identified the gap in securing the link
between IT and OT devices concerning the ISA 95 levels. To
address the gap, we have made a critical analysis of existing
cryptographic protocols that are suitable for the low power
restrictions common in OT devices (see IV-B). We then
conducted an exploratory case study to test the feasibility of
one such type of protocol in the Smart Lab (see V-A). Based
on this case study, we have drawn the design requirements
for interconnection and linked them with the relevant charac-
teristics for cryptographic protocols using QFD (see VI-B).
Finally, we will provide design recommendations on secure
interconnection around the MES and the PLCs (see VI-D).
We synergize relevance and rigor with a pragmatic research
approach inspired by the three cycle view of design science
research by Hevner 2007 [35].
IV. CRYPTOGRAPHY FOR IT/OT LINKS IN IIOT
A. SECURITY CHALLENGES FOR IIOT
INTERCONNECTION
The inclusion of end devices in the network introduces
various security issues, which need to be addressed through
different means. Especially if wireless technology is em-
ployed, it can become feasible for attackers to infiltrate a
network and attempt to read or modify transmissions, or
imitate legitimate nodes, for example to execute a man-in-
the-middle attack. An attacker who can modify transmissions
can disrupt production or even damage the equipment, among
other things.
We focus on the challenges of confidentiality, integrity,
and authenticity in IT/OT data exchange, as well as key
management in IIoT. Our motivations for choosing these foci
are: First, when surveying the cryptographic developments in
IIoT, we found that a majority of studies and protocols focus
on these four issues. Second, to limit the scope of this paper,
we restrict our attention to challenges that directly concern
the data transmission between the MES and the IIoT devices,
and that are commonly addressed by cryptographic means.
There are many other challenges to security in IIoT that we
do not focus on, such as:
• Authorization, which is the verification that an entity
is permitted to carry out certain operations or access
certain data [36];
• Non-repudiation, which means that the sender of a
transmission should not be able to credibly deny having
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sent it;
• The protection of data in storage from unauthorized
access or modification;
• Availability, which is the guarantee that the services and
resources of a system are always accessible, including
protection against denial-of-service attacks;
• Intrusion detection, which is the ability to detect ongo-
ing attacks [9];
• Post-incident management, which is the ability to re-
cover from an attack and to mitigate the damage
done [9];
• Accountability, which is the ability to pinpoint the
source of unauthorized behaviour.
Due to its limited presence in the literature, we do not focus
on non-repudiation, even though it may fall within our scope.
1) Confidentiality, integrity, and authenticity of IT/OT data
exchange
To prevent transmissions between IIoT devices and MES
servers from being read or modified, and to prevent forged
transmissions from being inserted, confidentiality, integrity,
and authenticity need to be guaranteed [32].
Confidentiality means that the data being transmitted can-
not be read by unauthorized parties. Confidentiality prevents
an attacker who has gained access to the network of a factory
from extracting trade secrets, such as production recipes, or
information about the current performance of the factory. It
is achieved using encryption. For example, a fast symmetric
cipher, such as the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES),
can be employed.
Integrity prevents modification of the data in transit, and
authenticity prevents the impersonation of the sender by an
attacker. This is needed to, e.g., prevent an attacker from
sending malicious instructions to IIoT devices that would
disrupt production, or from falsifying measurements sent
from the devices to the MES. Both integrity and authenticity
can be efficiently attained using symmetric cryptography, for
example with message authentication codes.
However, to apply these symmetric protocols, both parties
(the MES and the IIoT device) need to know a common
secret key ahead of time. The establishment of such a shared
key while verifying the identity of the other party is more
challenging, and is called authenticated key exchange. This
can be done using public key protocols, which however tend
to place higher requirements on processing time and memory.
Traditional choices like RSA and Diffie–Hellman are likely
to be unsuitable for low power IIoT devices. Another option
are password-authenticated key exchange protocols, such
as [37], in which the two parties exchange a secret key based
on a password (or other secret) known to both of them. This
however requires having a pre-shared password for each pair
of devices that need to interact, which increases the com-
plexity of adding new devices to a modular manufacturing
system.
2) Key management for IIoT devices
A requirement for authenticated key exchange is key man-
agement, that is, the generation, distribution, storage, updat-
ing, and revocation of long-term keys on IIoT devices [32].
Long-term keys installed on each device are needed to ex-
change shared secret keys between any two devices that
need to connect. While one option for key management is
to generate keys on a central key distribution center and pre-
install them on each device, this method is more vulnerable
to adversaries who can compromise or reverse engineer the
key distribution center. Instead, each device should be able to
generate its own keys.
B. KEY MANAGEMENT FOR IIOT
There is a range of cryptographic protocols that are specifi-
cally tailored to the IIoT. As explained in Section IV-A, the
question of key management and authenticated key exchange
between the PLCs and MES is of special interest. Below we
describe the four popular cryptographic approaches to these
problems that we have identified in the literature.
1) Public key infrastructure
One type of solution for key management is a traditional
public key infrastructure (PKI), as is commonly used with
TLS. In this case, each device has a public and a private
key, and a trusted certificate authority (CA) issues certificates
which guarantee that a given public key belongs to a certain
device on the network. The MES and a PLC can then use
these key pairs to authenticate each other and exchange
shared secret keys. For example, the approach proposed
by [7] is based on PKI. However, there is a large management
overhead to the issuing, storage, distribution, verification,
and revocation of certificates, and the necessary public key
operations tend to be computationally expensive, which may
make PKI unsuitable for the IIoT [38].
Fig. 3 is a Unified Modeling Language (UML) communi-
cation diagram which shows the data exchange involved in
the phases of certification and key exchange for a PKI. The
exchange between the CA and the other devices occurs dur-
ing the initialization phase of each device, and the exchange
of public keys and certificates happens when the two devices
first need to interact.
2) Protocols based on symmetric cryptography
To avoid expensive public key operations on low power
devices, several key exchange protocols have been proposed
which only require the device to execute symmetric cryp-
tography. These protocols depend on a pre-shared and static
symmetric key known to the device and some central server.
The central server then negotiates a key exchange between
two devices. Kerberos [39] is a well-known protocol of this
type, and the authenticated key exchange protocol by [11] is
specifically targeted at IoT. The networks by, e.g., Sigfox [40]
or LoRaWan [41] also use this type of protocol. One disad-
vantage of these protocols is the active involvement of the
6 VOLUME 4, 2016
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 License. For more information, see https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
This article has been accepted for publication in a future issue of this journal, but has not been fully edited. Content may change prior to final publication. Citation information: DOI
10.1109/ACCESS.2020.3035963, IEEE Access
Mantravadi et al.: Securing IT/OT Links for Low Power IIoT Devices: Design Considerations for Industry 4.0
FIGURE 3. UML communication diagram showing simplified data exchange
during setup and key exchange for a public key infrastructure.
FIGURE 4. UML communication diagram showing the simplified data
exchange during the three-party authenticated key exchange of [11].
central server during the key exchange, which complicates
the process and increases the attack surface.
Fig. 4 shows the simplified data exchange involved in the
key exchange phase for the protocol of [11]. The initiating
device and the key server first establish an intermediate
key using their pre-shared secret key. The key server sends
that intermediate key to the second device, encrypted using
their pre-shared secret key. Then, the two devices use this
intermediate key to perform authenticated key exchange.
3) Certificateless protocols
An alternative proposal is certificateless cryptography. This
is a variant of identity-based cryptography [42], in which the
identity of a device (e.g., its address) serves as its public
key, and private keys are generated by a trusted central server
called the private key generator. This has the advantage that
there is no need for devices to send public keys back and
forth, nor to validate them. However, identity-based cryptog-
raphy brings with it the key-escrow problem, which is to say
that the private key generator has access to the private key
of every device. Thus, the compromise of the private key
generator is particularly damaging.
In a certificateless protocol, there is still a central server,
called the key generation center (KGC), which generates
partial private keys for devices based on their identity [43].
From such a partial private key and a self-chosen secret value,
a device creates its final private key. The KGC therefore
does not know the private key of the device. The device
also creates its own public key. Fig. 5 and Fig. 6 show
Input: The public parameters params of the KGC and the
identity IDA of device A
Output: The public key PA and private key SA of device A
1: r ← a private pseudo-random value
2: xA ← SET_SECRET_VALUE(params, IDA, r)
3: PA ← SET_PUBLIC_KEY(params, IDA, xA)
4: DA ← partial private key requested from
the KGC for identity IDA
5: SA ← SET_PRIVATE_KEY(DA, xA)
FIGURE 5. Key generation for certificateless cryptography. This is run on
device A to generate its key pair. Notation from [43].
Input: The public parameters params and master secret key
master_key of the KGC, and the identity IDA of device A
Output: The partial private key DA of device A
1: DA ← PARTIAL_PRIVATE_KEY_EXTRACT(
params, master_key, IDA)
FIGURE 6. Generation of the partial private key on the KGC. This is run in
response to device A requesting a partial private key.
FIGURE 7. UML communication diagram showing simplified data exchange
during setup and key exchange for a certificateless cryptographic scheme.
the process of key generation for a device, showing the
operations performed by the device and the KGC.
Fig. 7 shows the data exchange involved in the phases of
setup and key exchange for a certificateless key exchange
protocol. The exchange from the KGC to the other devices
occurs during the initialization phase of each device, and the
exchange of public keys happens when the two devices first
need to interact. Multiple proposed certificateless schemes,
also for other purposes than key exchange, are targeted at
the IIoT, for example [12], [44]–[46]. However, some of
them have been broken, and since this type of scheme is
relatively new, there is not yet much confidence in many of
the protocols. Furthermore, the need to distribute public keys
reintroduces some of the overhead of PKI-based protocols
that identity-based cryptography avoids, and the problem of
key revocation needs to be addressed as well. So it is not clear
if this approach is currently preferable to PKI in practice.
4) Physical unclonable functions
Another approach for device authentication and key ex-
change for low power devices is the use of a physical un-
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clonable function (PUF). A PUF is a hardware circuit that,
given an input, generates an output which (ideally) depends
deterministically on the input but is otherwise unpredictable.
The output is determined by the physical characteristics of
the PUF, which are the result of random variations during
its production. Any two PUFs will generate different outputs
on a given input. Furthermore, it should not be feasible to
replicate the behaviour of a PUF in software or hardware.
Hence, the behaviour of the PUF of a device can be thought
of as its fingerprint. For an overview of the use of PUFs in
the IoT, see [47].
There are several protocols that employ PUFs to perform
authentication and key exchange between a low power device
and a server (e.g. [48]–[50]), or between two low power
devices with the help of a trusted third party (e.g. [50]). The
main advantage of these protocols is that they can function
even on devices with extremely limited computational power
and memory. As a downside, these protocols require either
the active involvement of a trusted central server during key
exchange, or a separate setup phase for every IIoT device
with each server it needs to communicate with.
C. SUMMARY
All the solutions discussed above, with the exception of some
protocols using PUFs, depend on having a trusted central
server that negotiates trust between the parties of the network.
To protect this central server from compromise, it should be
sufficiently separated from the other IT in the smart factory.
Of the solutions mentioned above, certificateless protocols
and public key infrastructures do not need this central server
to be connected to the network during regular operation.
Among these, certificateless schemes promise to be simpler
and potentially place lower requirements on the PLC hard-
ware.
Beyond cryptographic considerations, the goal of securing
the interconnection in smart factories needs collaboration
between different disciplines. Information systems, such as
MES, that are the backbone of smart factory operations
must be designed from the ground up with security in mind.
Given what we have learned from analyzing the literature
on IIoT security and cryptographic protocols, the following
additional questions arise:
• Are these specialized cryptographic schemes, in partic-
ular the certificateless protocols, efficient enough to run
on low power legacy PLCs?
• How can these cryptographic solutions be applied to
improve industrial cybersecurity?
• Is secure interconnection in smart factories a socio-
technical concern rather than a purely technical venture?
V. A CASE STUDY
To understand the operation, structure, technology, and chal-
lenges of a smart factory, we use the example of the Smart
Production Lab (Smart Lab) of Aalborg University (a learn-
ing cyber-physical factory). This exploratory case study al-
lows studying the connection between MES and PLCs in
an IIoT environment. Based on the example, we check the
feasibility of using certificateless schemes and can propose
a design for securing the data exchange between MES and
PLCs.
A. SMART LAB SETUP
The Smart Lab of Aalborg University is a “small Industry 4.0
factory” [51], which is based on the cyber-physical factory
by the Festo company. Festo is a leading industrial control
and automation company, based in Germany. The automated
production line of the Smart Lab has PLCs and is capable
of being integrated with third-party IIoT devices. It is a
learning lab with an assembly line that manufactures mock
mobile phones by performing various operations, such as
assembly, drilling, etc. For our study, we analyze its control
domain and its network architecture, as shown in Fig. 8. The
network can either operate fully wired or employ wireless
communication between the PLCs and the MES. The fully
automated assembly line is a discrete manufacturing facility
and includes:
• Five production modules with two stations each;
• An MES, installed on a single computer, is the high-
level process control and orchestrates overall produc-
tion;
• A Festo CECC-LK PLC on each station of each produc-
tion module;
• Switches which connect the PLCs and the MES com-
puter using ethernet cables;
• In the case of wireless operation, a wireless multi-access
gateway (MAGW) on each module and on the MES
computer, which tunnel ethernet traffic over Wi-Fi or
Long-Term Evolution (LTE) [52].
The cyber-physical factory, with its modular manufactur-
ing systems, is meant for studying Industry 4.0 enablers. It
fits the definition of the IIoT system by Boyes [1], in that
it consists of networked PLCs which control a physical pro-
cess, and which exchange real-time control information with
an MES through the OPC Unified Architecture (OPC UA)
protocol. Furthermore, the lab connects to an IIoT cloud
platform by KUKA, which can be accessed through a web
service.
During operation, the products are placed on carriers,
which are transported through the production line on con-
veyor belts. During the process, the data exchange between
the MES and the PLCs on the stations is as follows:
1) When a carrier with a product arrives at a station, the
PLC at the station identifies the carrier via RFID and
sends the carrier ID to the MES.
2) The MES then responds to the PLC with instructions
on which actions should be performed on the product.
3) When the action has been performed, the PLC informs
the MES about the completion.
4) Once the carrier can continue to the next station, the
MES notifies the PLC, which sends the carrier on its
way.
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FIGURE 8. The network layout of the Smart Lab [52]. The green arrows represent ethernet cables that are used in wired operation. The blue elements are present
only in wireless operation.
The Smart Lab is a modular manufacturing system, where
the manufacturing line consists of several modules compris-
ing controllers and machine tools [51]. This kind of setup, en-
abled by IIoT, supports reconfigurability in a factory, which
is required to meet future market demands for high product
variety and short product life cycles [53]. However, the two
security concerns in this scenario can be:
1) During the steps listed above, an attacker could in-
terfere with the data exchange by performing a man-
in-the-middle attack and, for example, halt production
or cause it to create the wrong product, as mentioned
in [54].
2) To provide security in such modular systems, it must
be possible to quickly establish secure connections
between the MES and IIoT devices that are newly
added to the production line. This is crucial to enable
plug and play of IIoT devices in a smart factory.
B. CRITERIA FOR ASSESSING SECURE
INTERCONNECTION
We assess our solution for secure interconnection based on
the following two criteria.
1) Resistance to network sniffing and man-in-the-middle
attacks between MES and PLCs
While there are many attacks an adversary can attempt after
gaining access to the factory network, we focus on an attacker
who reads the data transferred between the MES and a PLC
of the Smart Lab or tries to insert themselves between the
two, intercepting and potentially modifying all the data. This
is in light of a 2016 study [54], in which a penetration test
was conducted on the Smart Lab to determine its weakness
to various attacks. The test was conducted on-site, from the
internal network of the Smart Lab, focusing on the data ex-
change between the MES and PLCs. At that time, the lab was
set up with only the default security configuration and was
found to be weak in many ways. Among others, a port scan
revealed many open ports on some of the network devices,
including unsecure services like Telnet and File Transfer
Protocol. Network sniffing found much of the traffic to be
unencrypted and to include information about the network
and its devices that would be useful for further attacks. The
paper also mentions the possibility of conducting a man-
in-the-middle attack via, say, Address Resolution Protocol
spoofing, which would allow an attacker to modify data and
commands exchanged between the MES and PLCs. Thus,
the paper demonstrates the need for strong encryption and
authentication of the data exchange between the MES and
PLCs.
While these considerations assume that an attacker has
access to the factory network, we stress that they are relevant
even in case of a remote attacker. This is because after first
having compromised a local device over the Internet, the
attacker is then able to carry out further attacks from within
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the network. An example for this is the TRITON attack in
Saudi Arabia, in which the attackers first gained access to
the IT systems of a petrochemical plant, and from there were
able to move on to the OT network and finally infect safety
systems [55].
2) Suitability for PLCs with low processing power and
memory
We note from the literature we reviewed in Section II that
the PLCs used in factories tend to have low computational
power, and the same is true in the case of the Smart Lab.
Hence, when choosing a cryptographic solution, we need to
ensure that the PLCs are capable of running it, as otherwise
expensive new hardware would need to be bought. Modu-
larity allows connections with various IIoT devices and it is
highly likely that some of them will be low power devices.
C. PROCEDURE TO CHECK THE FEASIBILITY OF A
CRYPTOGRAPHIC SOLUTION
We check the feasibility of certificateless schemes for data
exchange between MES and PLCs because some of the
schemes have low computational power and memory require-
ments with an uncomplicated key exchange process. (We will
elaborate on this in Section VI). The feasibility was checked
in two steps:
1) Hardware feasibility: We choose a certificateless key
exchange scheme with an open-source implementation
and for which benchmarks exist [45] and compare the
specifications of the PLCs used in the Smart Lab to the
requirements of the scheme and the hardware used in
the benchmarks.
2) Network feasibility: To check the feasibility of the
implementation of such a scheme in the Smart Lab, we
consider how the protocol fits into the existing network
architecture.
D. SUMMARY
The Smart Lab presents a case example for a smart factory
because it is built around the Festo CP Factory, allowing the
addition and removal of modules, while integrating relevant
Industry 4.0 technologies [51]. In its default configuration, it
is highly vulnerable to cyberattacks from anyone who gains
access to its network. Based on this, we discuss the design
considerations in the following section.
VI. DESIGN CONSIDERATIONS & DISCUSSION
While previous studies on IIoT security did attempt to close
the gap of integrating cryptographic schemes with an MES
and PLCs, we follow the systems thinking approach, which
studies the problem within the context of a larger system (a
smart factory). This is beneficial because we will then be able
to understand how a security implementation can interrelate
with an information system like MES and how it should
perform over time.
A. DESIGN REQUIREMENTS FOR SECURE
INTERCONNECTION IN INDUSTRY 4.0
Industry 4.0 has smart factories that are reconfigurable. So
far, the Smart Lab served its purpose of giving requirement
specifications for a cyber-physical factory, which is synony-
mous to a smart factory. But the real-life case of a smart
factory will need to consider the business requirements for
Industry 4.0. Industry 4.0 sets out a vision for manufacturers
to match future market requirements by manufacturing goods
with high product variety and shorter product life cycles.
Apart from the obvious requirements, such as wireless com-
munication, the following should also be considered:
1) Low cost of hardware such as PLCs;
2) Exploiting IIoT opportunities to support a high degree
of product variety in manufacturing;
3) Low implementation complexity in terms of reuse of
existing IT systems (such as MES), especially for small
scale manufacturers.
B. DETERMINING SECURITY REQUIREMENTS FOR A
SMART FACTORY: USING QFD METHOD ON SMART LAB
To further distill the design requirements, we use the QFD
method, which consists of a design tool called the House of
Quality. QFD is a popular technique to enhance the quality
of a system to be designed by identifying important design
requirements. QFD was first developed in Japan in the 60s
for the industrial engineering domain and gained popularity
among other fields, such as software engineering, military
applications, educational services, etc., since it is a structured
and interdisciplinary technique.
We use the case of the Smart Lab to smoothly translate
the high-level requirements of a cyber-physical factory into
low-level security requirements for a cryptographic solution
and to gauge their relative importance. Based on the percent
of importance of each design characteristic, we prioritize
the design characteristics of secure interconnection between
MES and PLCs of the automated production line. We con-
duct the QFD in two phases (Fig. 9). In the first house
(Fig. 10), the relationship matrix shows how much each
design characteristic contributes to achieving a given design
requirement. The correlation matrix, which is the roof of the
house, presents whether the design characteristics synergize
or conflict with each other. The second house (Fig. 11) works
in the same manner.
Security assessment for a smart factory:
We use two phases in our QFD matrix to gather the re-
quirements for secure interconnection in a smart factory (see
Fig. 9). They are:
1) In the first house, QFD leads to matching up the design
requirements of interconnection in smart factories with
the design characteristics for security.
2) In the second house, the design characteristics for
security are used to deduce the low-level requirements
for the selection of a cryptographic scheme.
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FIGURE 9. The two phases of QFD.
First house based on the case of the Smart Lab:
We choose the following design requirements, which adhere
to the smart factory competencies: a wireless connection,
connecting to IIoT devices, cybersecurity around an auto-
mated production line, modularity of machines, low cost of
implementation, and low complexity of implementation. Our
chosen design requirements are: the use of the existing PLCs
and MES, the costs of the PLCs, the ease of key exchange,
authenticity, and confidentiality. We include integrity under
authenticity for the purpose of our QFD analysis, since
they are closely related concepts that are usually achieved
simultaneously by the same protocol, and would give almost
identical evaluations.
We discuss the rows of the first house (Fig. 10) individu-
ally:
1) Connect through wireless: Authenticity and confiden-
tiality are crucial requirements for wireless communi-
cation due to its higher vulnerability to attacks. This is
a particularly important point as future factories might
use 5G.
2) Connect to IIoT devices: This is a core requirement for
smart factories. Authenticity is a crucial requirement
for this because it prevents sabotage of the manufac-
turing process.
3) Cybersecurity around automated production lines: Cy-
bersecurity is required to prevent sabotage of manufac-
turing orders and theft of competitive production in-
formation. Authenticity and confidentiality are crucial
requirements for this.
4) Enable modularity of machines: Reconfigurable man-
ufacturing systems enable flexibility and support pro-
duction that is high in variety with short product life
cycles. To enable this level of modularity, it is crucial
that devices can readily exchange shared keys when-
ever they need to connect to a new peer.
5) Cost and complexity of implementation: The ability to
employ low-cost PLCs and to reuse the existing infras-
tructure greatly assists in reducing cost and complexity.
From the calculated importance of the design character-
istics, we conclude that authenticity is the most important
design target for secure interconnection in smart factories.
This matches with the idea that an attacker can do the most
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damage to a factory by disrupting and manipulating the
production process.
Second house for cryptographic considerations:
To ensure that cryptography-based security solutions adhere
to design targets, we chose the following cryptographic char-
acteristics: processing time required (time required to execute
the protocol on the given hardware), memory requirements
(random-access memory (RAM) needed for executing the
protocol), communication complexity (the amount of data
needing to be transferred during the execution of the pro-
tocol), resistance to computational attacks (e.g., breaking
encryption by only analyzing the encrypted data stream),
resistance to infrastructure compromise (if, e.g., a central
server is hacked into), and connection without third party
involvement (no involvement of a central server during the
key exchange between two machines).
The rows of the second house (Fig. 11) are discussed
below:
1) Reuse of existing PLCs and MES: Low requirements
on the hardware of PLCs make it more likely that
legacy PLCs can be used. In the case of our Smart
Lab, the existing PLCs appear to be capable of using
certificateless cryptosystems.
2) Low cost of the PLCs: Low requirements of a cryp-
tosystem can enable the use of cheaper PLCs.
3) Ease of key exchange: Key exchange is faster and eas-
ier if the processing and communication requirements
are lower. It is furthermore helpful if the key exchange
can be carried out by only these two devices. For the
Smart Lab, third party involvement would mean the
inclusion of an entirely new server in the network,
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which we want to avoid.
4) Authenticity and Confidentiality: Evidently, to fulfil
these requirements, the cryptographic scheme must be
resistant to computational attacks. It is also hel ful if
the compromise of certain devices in the network does
not allow the attacker to break the cryptography in
other parts.
From the calculated relative importance of the crypto-
graphic characteristics, we see that resistance to different
kinds of attacks is the most important aspect. This is not sur-
prising, since having vulnerable cryptography would defeat
the purpose. The next most important are low requirements
on memory and computation time. We conclude that the
cryptographic protocols should be efficient, but not at the cost
of security.
C. REQUIREMENTS FOR SECURE IT/OT CONNECTION
We address the security concerns raised in Section V-A by
checking the feasibility of a cryptographic solution in the
case of the Smart Lab, as described in Section V-C.
Hardware requirements:
To verify that certificateless schemes can satisfy the re-
quirements for low power in the Smart Lab, we look for
a certificateless cryptographic scheme which is targeted at
low power devices and which has an implementation that
allows us to deduce the concrete hardware requirements.
The LiKe certificateless key exchange scheme [45] has an
implementation available on GitHub1. Below we compare
the requirements of LiKe to the specifications of the Festo
CECC-LK PLCs [56] used in the Smart Lab:
1https://github.com/pietrotedeschi/like-iot
(accessed May 26, 2020)
1) The LiKe protocol requires 13594 bytes of read-only
memory and 960 bytes of RAM, which is well within
the capabilities of the CECC-LK PLC, which has 2 MB
of permanent storage and 16 MB of RAM.
2) In the benchmarks using OpenMote-b devices [57], the
LiKe key exchange is reported to take around 340 ms
for an 80-bit security level. Since the OpenMote-b has
a clock speed of 32 MHz, which is less than the 400
MHz reported for the CECC-LK PLC, we expect that
the PLCs should be able to complete the key exchange
in a reasonable time. However, a direct comparison
is impossible here, since the OpenMote-b contains
hardware acceleration features for cryptographic oper-
ations, which speed up the key exchange.
We note, however, that it is not possible to directly use the
existing implementation of LiKe in the Smart Lab since it
was developed for the OpenWSN network stack [58], which
is not available for the Festo CECC-LK PLC. Hence a new
implementation would be needed.
Since we are taking an abductive approach to this study,
we consider implementation to be outside the scope for this
paper. Our contribution is instead on the architectural re-
quirements side. Finally, we stress that we do not specifically
recommend the LiKe cryptosystem, as it is a recent proposal
and has not yet been subject to sufficient scrutiny to be used
in real-world applications. But it serves as an example to
demonstrate that certificateless cryptosystems can satisfy the
low power requirements for our Smart Lab.
Network requirements:
We assume the KGC to be running on a separate computer
that is not connected to the Smart Lab network. Instead,
each device that is to be part of the network is individually
connected to the KGC for a short time during initialization.
At that time, the KGC provides the device with a partial
private key, which allows it to derive a proper private/public
key pair. Once connected to the network, the device can use
this key pair to securely exchange a shared secret key with
other devices, without further involvement of the KGC or any
other third party. Assuming that the chosen protocol is secure,
this will prevent man-in-the-middle attacks, since an attacker
cannot obtain a private/public key pair for the identity of
another device and hence cannot impersonate it. The protocol
works equally well whether the connection between the PLC
and the MES server is achieved via an ethernet cable or
wirelessly since the cryptographic protocol is independent of
exactly how the data are physically sent from one device to
another.
D. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR DESIGNING A SECURE
SMART FACTORY
1) Security in the distributed control architecture
Distributed control is achieved in the automated production
line by distributed information principles. To support this
idea, the Level 3 architecture needs to be designed in a
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FIGURE 12. Proposed high-level architecture of secure data exchange between MES and lower levels (based on the Smart Lab).
manner in which some of the control decisions from MES
are outsourced to the level below. Therefore, this paper works
towards securing the link between Level 3 and below.
The smart factory of Industry 4.0 has cyber-physical
systems communicating and coordinating over IIoT [15].
This type of distributed control architecture is supported by
edge computing. It enables modular manufacturing systems,
where modules with PLCs can be added to and removed from
a production line. When a PLC is added, it potentially needs
to establish connections with multiple new edge servers, and
hence be able to promptly share secret keys with them. This
calls for an uncomplicated key exchange protocol that can be
executed without the active involvement of a third party.
The implementation of Industry 4.0 requires vertical and
horizontal integration [13], [59]. In the industrial automation
field, vertical integration refers to the integration of IT and
OT systems from different levels of the ISA 95 hierarchy, and
horizontal integration refers to the integration of IT systems
used at different stages of the supply chain, both within and
between enterprises. The concept of the IIoT goes beyond
the extent of a single factory or company and can include
different parts of a supply network. The horizontal integra-
tion of systems for data visibility among different parts of
a supply network for example allows the manufacturer to
quickly adjust to changes in demand further down the supply
chain.
IT/OT integration is the first step to achieve the integration
along vertical and horizontal value chains. Therefore, this
paper addresses security when the IT and OT systems are
integrated.
a: Integration of IIoT with the ISA 95 hierarchy
Digitalization is an enabler of smart factories, and IIoT inter-
connection is imperative to this. It involves a certain degree
of decentralization of operations management but need not
challenge the existence of well-established IT systems such
as MES. A smart factory vision can be achieved with an
agnostic approach where both the IT and OT domains con-
verge to fulfill the common goals of improving operational
efficiency. This means IT and OT are neither competing with
each other nor replacing each other. We present the secure,
digitalized, and interconnected IT/OT architecture for the
Smart Lab in Fig. 12. Based on this architecture, the QFD
analysis, and the feasibility considerations, we synthesize a
generalized model for the systems in a smart factory using
a certificateless key exchange protocol in Fig. 13. With this
model, we also want to stress that the ISA 95 structure is still
useful in a smart factory, where the Level 3 functionalities
of ISA 95 should be hosted locally for reasons of security,
latency, and resistance to network interruptions.
The IIoT living within the ISA 95 structure could mean
that the Level 3 (MES) becomes more distributed. This
goes hand in hand with factories adopting edge computing
(see II-B), where most of the data are collected and processed
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FIGURE 13. UML class diagram of the proposed architecture for a smart factory, describing the entities as well as the relationships between them.
on servers near the point of production. For this reason and
because of the need for modularity, the number of IT/OT con-
nections will increase. These connections can for example
be secured by using certificateless cryptographic protocols as
we present in this paper.
Traditionally, industrial automation and control systems
were secured from outside attacks by keeping them separated
from Level 4 (i.e., ERP) and the Internet. This can mean
setting up a firewall or demilitarized zone between Level 4
and the lower levels [1]. However, this goes counter to the
vision of interconnection in the IIoT, because IIoT allows
breaking the traditional hierarchical control architecture [22].
Instead, IIoT enables a distributed control architecture, so
that additional focus needs to be placed on security within
industrial control systems. In some modern cases, demilita-
rized zones might not be applicable at all, as some standard
MES solutions are offered as a module of ERP where the
common server is hosted on the cloud. Therefore, the security
challenges are of a different nature, in that the cloud infras-
tructure is a particularly valuable target from the point of
view of an attacker. We recommend however not completely
abandoning the idea of separating different zones: The PLCs
and other low power devices should not be directly connected
to the Internet, since this would expose them to attack.
Instead, they should only connect to the MES or edge servers
within the site, which may do initial data processing, and in
turn connect to, e.g., a cloud server, as we show in Fig. 12.
The edge servers tend to have more computational power and
are thus better able to securely connect to the Internet using
established methods like TLS. Although this introduces a
level of indirection that may affect the responsiveness, this
can be ameliorated if the most time-sensitive computations
are conducted on edge servers. Even so, it is still important
to secure the IT/OT connections, as attackers may get access
to the shop floor network.
b: Applying cryptography on low power OT devices
It is well known that it is difficult to integrate a diverse range
of OT devices, often with low processing power and memory,
into traditional security systems. For example, Roman [38]
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FIGURE 14. UML object diagram of the instantiated architecture (Fig. 13) for the Smart Lab.
writes:
“These current security mechanisms, based on tra-
ditional public key infrastructures will almost cer-
tainly not scale to accommodate the IoT’s amalgam
of contexts and devices.”
Boyes [1] mentions the difficulty of using strong encryption
with IIoT devices which have constrained processing power
and memory. Yu [22] also mentions this issue with regard
to establishing shared secret keys between low power de-
vices. We address this issue by considering cryptographic
protocols, particularly certificateless protocols, that are suited
for low power devices and involve less management over-
head than does a public key infrastructure. We check their
feasibility in the example of the Smart Lab. To illustrate
how a certificateless key exchange scheme could fit into the
Smart Lab, we give an instantiation of the proposed model of
Fig. 13 for the Smart Lab in Fig. 14.
We have addressed research question Q1 by giving archi-
tectural and cryptographic recommendations for securing the
(wired or wireless) connection from the MES to the PLCs in
an IIoT context. We have used the Smart Lab as a basis for
our inquiry. Q2 was also addressed by considering the Smart
Lab to derive the requirements for secure IT/OT connectivity
on the design and cryptographic levels using QFD.
2) Future work in standardization
The devices used in a factory may be from different vendors,
so we believe that future work should develop standardized
and open protocols to secure the interconnection between
them. Any standardized solution for security in a distributed
control architecture should be able to run on legacy systems.
This requires that a secure smart factory can be developed
on top of existing equipment and does not require new
infrastructure. This becomes easier if the vendors of the
PLCs consider security needs and design their PLCs to be
powerful enough to run standardized protocols. ISA has also
been addressing the issue of industrial cybersecurity in the
ISA/IEC 62443 standard [60] due to the increase of both
intra and inter-organization interconnectivity. The OPC UA
standard also includes a security model [23], [61]. We rec-
ommend that such standards be followed.
In this paper, we present a technological solution for se-
curing the IT/OT link. However, cybersecurity issues extend
beyond the technical realm and are rather a socio-technical
concern. For example, an attacker can gain access to MES
or OT systems by using social engineering techniques, such
as phishing or tailgating. A manufacturing enterprise must
counteract cyberattacks by not only exclusively focusing on
technological solutions but also by training the employees in
security protocols.
3) Developing the design principle of secure interconnection
As discussed in Section II-A, MES is critical for Industry 4.0
and IIoT-connected MES enables smart factories. Since se-
curity concerns must drive MES design, we develop a design
principle for smart factories with MES.
Principle of security: MES connecting to OT devices
should be able to verify the identity of the device and
establish an authenticated and encrypted connection in an
ad-hoc manner, and vice-versa, ideally without involving a
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third party. This principle facilitates IIoT interconnection by
mitigating the risk of cyber-attacks that disrupt production by
exploiting the increased connectivity between MES and OT.
Owing to the recommendations we present in this paper,
bringing security to the interconnection in smart factories
need not be an expensive project, nor should it prevent
manufacturers from exploiting IIoT opportunities. It can be
achieved by reusing existing system capabilities with effi-
cient cryptography.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
We studied the smart factory design principle of interconnec-
tion and reviewed studies on security in the IIoT concerning
Level 3 of ISA 95, and learned that the literature highlights
vulnerabilities around the OT architecture. We determined
that the IT/OT link (such as the data exchange between
the MES and PLCs) is a weak point in a factory as far as
cybersecurity is concerned.
Driven by the need to secure the IT/OT link with appropri-
ate cryptographic protocols and infrastructure, especially in
the case of modular manufacturing systems, we listed some
of the security challenges faced by the IIoT. By focusing on
the data exchange between an MES and a PLC, we gave an
overview of types of cryptographic schemes that are tailored
to the low power and real-time nature of the IIoT. A feasibil-
ity study was done based on the Smart Lab (an Industry 4.0
learning factory) to assess if certificateless cryptographic
schemes can be applied in a smart factory context (with
wireless, low-cost, and low power requirements). However,
there is currently no consensus on how to secure the IT/OT
connection. Due to this gap in knowledge, we deduce that
cryptography in manufacturing is not a popular academic
topic yet and existing cryptographic schemes for the IIoT
need further cryptanalytic scrutiny.
With this paper, we tried to raise awareness of the pressing
issue of industrial cybersecurity around the IIoT. Based on
the results from the QFD assessment, we provided recom-
mendations on how to design a secure smart factory from an
information systems perspective. While we used the Smart
Lab for this, users can repeat the assessment and obtain
scores based on their priorities to document design consid-
erations for bringing security to their smart factory. We for-
mulated a design principle for information systems security
(see VI-D3) to uphold the vision for modular manufacturing
systems in manufacturing enterprises. We have also deduced
that the structure of ISA 95, where there is a separation of
Level 3 functionalities from the business domain, is compat-
ible with and indeed helpful for security in smart factories.
We therefore recommend considering the structure of ISA 95
for the purpose of security and modularity.
We conclude that designing security for a smart factory is a
socio-technical challenge and securing the link between MES
and PLCs in the IIoT can be a step toward it.
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